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Reptile prime ministers and flying Nazi saucers—extreme and sometimes off-wall
conclusion are typical ingredients of conspiracy theories. While individual differences
are a common research topic concerning conspiracy theories, the role of extreme
statements in the process of acquiring and passing on conspiratorial stories has not been
regarded in an experimental design so far. We identified six morphological components
of conspiracy theories empirically. On the basis of these content categories a set of
narrative elements for a 9/11 story was compiled. These elements varied systematically in
terms of conspiratorial allegation, i.e., they contained official statements concerning the
events of 9/11, statements alleging to a conspiracy limited in time and space as well
as extreme statements indicating an all-encompassing cover-up. Using the method of
narrative construction, 30 people were given a set of cards with these statements and
asked to construct the course of events of 9/11 they deem most plausible. When extreme
statements were present in the set, the resulting stories were more conspiratorial; the
number of official statements included in the narrative dropped significantly, whereas the
self-assessment of the story’s plausibility did not differ between conditions. This indicates
that blatant statements in a pool of information foster the synthesis of conspiracy theories
on an individual level. By relating these findings to one of Germany’s most successful (and
controversial) non-fiction books, we refer to the real-world dangers of this effect.
Keywords: conspiracy theories, narrative construction, adaptation, liking, preference, external validity, reframing,
assimilation
INTRODUCTION
A government arms the nation’smost prominent skyscrapers with
explosives and directs passenger planes right into these buildings:
taken at face value, such an evil scenario seems completely off-
wall. However, such accusations are a common, probably a typical
ingredient of conspiracy theories. While a government trying to
conceal acts of failure—for example, the underestimation of a
terrorist threat—might be seen in the realm of possibility, the
widespread acceptance of very complex malicious plots, such as
a government deliberately killing thousands of the own people, is
a challenge for psychology. On the one hand, we need to under-
stand why many people adhere to a world view which implies
permanent threat to every individual (including themselves).
On the other hand, disturbing revelations—such as the recent
PRISM 1 leak—make it clear that denying global conspiracies per
se would be ignorant.
This challenge has multiple theoretical as well as methodolog-
ical aspects: how and why does the presence of quite extreme
information influences the processes of opinion formation? How
1PRISM is an US government codename for an extensive data collection
effort, allegedly organized within an intelligence operation based on electronic
surveillance procedures. The existence of PRISM was leaked by IT developer
Edward Snowden in June, 2013.
can this process be captured and investigated in a valid and yet
standardized way? And how can research that addresses these
processes take a non-arbitrary stance in the assessment of an
individual’s conspiracy beliefs, when there is no clear distinction
between true and false?
There have been various research efforts on individual dif-
ferences in the endorsement of conspiracy theories (e.g., Swami
et al., 2010). There is a finding that people are willing to
adopt obviously contradictory conspiratorial facts at the same
time (Wood et al., 2012). Lewandowsky et al. (2013b) indi-
cate that belief in one conspiracy theory is correlated with the
belief of other theories. Swami and Coles (2010) provide a
comprehensive overview of research on this subject. The pro-
active and constructive aspect of creating a (conspiracy) the-
ory, however, has not been regarded in an experimental design
so far.
The analysis of documents like websites and books is appeal-
ing, but still has also clear limitations, as we cannot take for
granted that these published theories are representative for the
stories the majority of people would adopt. Millions of people
around the globe create, compile, process, discuss, and repro-
duce conspiracy theories not only on internet platforms, private
websites or blogs, but also in personal communication, which is
hard to assess in research. We assume these people to be active
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information seekers who construct views on important events
that match their beliefs and values; and whose beliefs are in turn
influenced by information. Extreme theories, in books as well as
on the web, would serve as a mixed bag, that (speaking with P.T.
Barnum) offer “something for everyone”; so everybody is free to
adopt some story fragments only. As we have no further informa-
tion about and control of the regarding creators, proliferators and
consumers of such content we needmethods—in addition to con-
tent analysis (e.g., Lewandowsky et al., 2013a), interviews (e.g.,
Sapountzis and Condor, 2013) and standardized questionnaires
(e.g., Lewandowsky et al., 2013b)—which allow for the dynamic
character of compiling, reframing and linking of information to
unfold.
Here, we suggest the method of narrative construction as a
new means to explore the multi-facet phenomenon of conspiracy
theories. It allows an individual to construct a story for a given
event (e.g., the terrorist attacks of 9/11) by selecting and com-
piling pieces of information related to this event from different
content categories. By doing so, we can assess how much conspir-
acy an individual assumes to be at work concerning the event;
without compelling the researcher to define what a “true” story
looks like.
This article consists of two main parts. In the first part, we
present an exploratory study that helped us to identify core
constituents of conspiracy theories in a bottom-up approach.
Subsequently, these constituents were used as templates, for pieces
of information about 9/11 (retrieved from the World Wide Web).
We compiled two sets of information: one set with official and
mildly conspiratorial (i.e., with limitations in space and time)
information and another set that comprised additional extremely
conspiratorial statements. In a laboratory setting test subjects
were asked to construct a plausible story of the events of 9/11
using one of these sets of information. This main study showed
that the presence of extreme information induced a signifi-
cant shift of the resulting stories toward a conspiracy theory;
importantly, this shift was not paid for by lower plausibility as
shown by ratings each test subject gave afterwards for his/her
story.
In the second part of this article, we discuss a recent pub-
lic debate on Sarrazin’s (2010) book Deutschland schafft sich ab
(Germany is abolishing itself ) in the light of these findings. The
book is among the most successful non-fiction works of the past
decade in Germany, (in-) famous for its polemic portrayal of
Islamic culture (Sarrazin had been prominent before this debate
as senator of finances in Berlin from 2002 to 2009 and as member
of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank until 2010).
Sarrazin’s book was our point of origin: Not only was its impact
on political discourse huge; the author presented a patchwork
mixture of established facts, assumptions, wild speculations and
polemic accusations. We consider his book, at least compatible
with conspiracy theories, if not even a conspiracy theory on its
own, as we will discuss later on.
If the presence of extreme statements in a pool of given infor-
mation seduces people to disregard standard information, con-
spiracy theories can be dangerous indeed: It may shift the tenor
of public debate and the individual’s judgments of plausibility
toward the extreme.
MATERIALS ANDMETHODS
RATIONALE FOR USING THE METHOD OF NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION
In spite of the numerous attempts to define what a conspiracy
theory is [e.g., Grüter, 2010, even dedicates a full monograph to
this question], we found it hard to derive distinct categories of
elements from any of such definitions. Many authors refer to the
definition of Hofstadter (1965), who claims that a conspiracy the-
ory of a vast, sinister and yet subtle machinery of influence to
destroy a way of life. This sums up the main features of com-
mon conspiracies, but is too vague to allow for the generation of
distinct narrative elements (Bale, 2007). Bale confines himself to
political conspiracies aiming at a more differentiated definition.
However, he presents discriminative features that mainly define
conspiracies by the attributes of the conspiring force. In other
words, he discusses a conspiracy’s characteristics, which is not
the same as a conspiracy theory’s narrative parts. Additionally, we
think that such an attempt would run the danger that primar-
ily the well-known and mostly extreme conspiracy theories—the
ones that were used to generate the definitions—become paradig-
matic. Research would then focus on such extremes while missing
the subtle shadings and nuances of individual theories and every-
day phenomena.
In his analysis of Russian folk tales, Propp (1972) has already
pointed to the problems of a classification without a guiding prin-
ciple for defining a story’s features. His solution was a bottom-up
categorization of 100 folk stories. He discriminated the tales’ con-
tents and the narrative functions of the elements he found and
finally arrived at seven essential story elements (like, the Hero or
the Adversary). Thus, to identify the morphological constants of
conspiracy theories, we decided to take a bottom-up empirical
stance.
PREREQUISITE: A BOTTOM-UP ASSEMBLY OF CONSPIRACY THEORY
BUILDING BLOCKS
In a preliminary study, we determined which elements are likely
to constitute a conspiracy theory. Major aim was to collect max-
imally diverse kinds of such theories. Five interviewers asked 38
people (students from the University of Bamberg, their friends
and relatives) which “intrigues and secret schemes, for exam-
ple conspiracy theories” they know of. Afterwards, we asked
them to reproduce their “favorite conspiracy theory” by their
own words. The interviewers also wanted to know where they
had heard this story, and why it is their favorite conspiracy the-
ory. As a next step, we asked “which elements are part of most
conspiracy theories” as open question, recording the answers
verbatim.
The recorded material formed the basis for a bottom-up
process of categorization. Each interviewer tried to rephrase
the answers from another interviewer’s participants on a more
abstract level. The derived categories had then to be defended
in an argument with the other interviewers. This kind of argu-
mentative validation, as described by Mayring (2005), went on
until all interviewers agreed on a set of six categories for “ele-
ments of conspiracy theories,” including category definitions. Due
to this inductive process, not all categories are strictly homoge-
nous; however, a further subdivision of categories could not be
justified in the argumentative process based on the given data.
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In order to evaluate the importance of these basic items of
conspiracy theories, we printed them on cards (one category
along with definition and examples on each card) and handed
out shuffled sets (each set containing all elements) to 28 partic-
ipants (undergraduate students of psychology, 23 female, Mage =
19.7 years) which had not participated in the initial interviews.
The participants were asked to rank these elements by “laying
out the cards in the order of subjective importance” and to write
down the rank of each item on the respective card when finished.
We aggregated these ratings by ordering the items according to
the mode of rank orders. The bottom-up generated categories
were odd event, evidence, non-transparency, publicity, group of
conspirers, andmyth (enlisted in Table 1).
METHOD OF NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION
Our aim was to allow for the idiosyncratic process of construct-
ing a story under controlled and comparable conditions. We
developed the method of narrative construction that enables us
to observe the process, and to quantify each participant’s output
with regard to the hypothesis.
The material for the narrative construction paradigm is a com-
pilation of laminated paper cards (each about the size of a playing
card, i.e., 10× 6 cm). These cards are compiled according to the
hypotheses in the following manner (exemplified in Figure 1):
• For each independent variable there is a corresponding suit,
comparable to spades, hearts, diamonds and clubs in a deck of
playing cards. For example, if one would be interested to com-
pare internal vs. external attribution in a personal narrative,
there would be one suit of cards with statements compati-
ble with internal control beliefs, and one suit with cards all
assuming external control. For our case, we compiled one suit
containing official, one containing limited conspiratorial, and
one containing unlimited conspiratorial items (representing a
three-stepped approach).
• Within the suits, there are cards for the categories, i.e., the ele-
ments deemed important for the narrative. Each suit contains
corresponding cards, like there’s an ace of spades, an ace of
hearts, etc. For exploring a narrative of control beliefs, there
might be one card for work (in the card came metaphor, a
king), one for family (say, a queen), one for sports (a joker),
etc. (in contrast to playing cards, there is no rank order obvi-
ous to the participant). In our case, with six conspiracy theory
elements/categories, there should be at least six cards within
each suit—one per category, corresponding between suits.
• To allow for more complex narratives, it is possible to com-
pile more than one card per category. For example, one might
include three items concerning private life. This is not a feature
of playing cards, but can be thought of, e.g., several Queens, all
slightly different in their appearance. In conspiracy research,
for example more than one card concerning the odd event
might be useful
Each participant is handed out the set of shuffled cards at once.
They are asked to “construct a story that is—in his personal
view—a plausible explanation” for cause for a certain event or
process (for example, work-life balance; or, as in our case, 9/11).
In the beginning, the participant is instructed to read each card
and to coarsely categorize the items into two groups, a “plausi-
ble” one and a “not plausible” one. Each of these categorizations
could be revised in the course of the process. After the initial pre-
sorting, the participant is asked “to serialize the cards to produce
a stringent and plausible course of events using as few or as many
cards” as he wants. Again, removing or adding cards to the “not
plausible”-heap is still, and explicitly, allowed. Furthermore, no
time restriction is applied.
Table 1 | Items generated by a bottom-up process of categorization, ordered descending by importance.
Category label Category definition Standard examples
Odd event There is a relevant event that gains interest of many people. There are some
open questions concerning this event
• “Apollo-mission”
• “9/11”
• “Kennedy assassination”
Evidence There is evidence, observations, artefacts, and other indications, that are used by
conspiracy theorists to support their theories. There are secret signs and
symbols supporting the conspiracy theorists’ view
• “Symbols seen everywhere”
• “Undeniable facts”
Non-transparency The situation about available information concerning a topic is non-transparent.
Media coverage is obscure. There is cover-up and manipulation of information
• “Cover-up of reality”
• “Not enough inside-information available”
Publicity There is an official viewpoint for a topic. Public agents (e.g., government,
experts, scientists, intelligence agencies) acknowledge this viewpoint. However,
this account is regarded by some with scepticism and distrust. The official
viewpoint contradicts the non-official viewpoint by conspiracy theorists
• “The media spread information”
• “Experts that testify”
Group of conspirers There is a group of conspirers. These conspirers are evil and influential, and
strive to gain more and more money and power. They forge a secret plot at the
expense of other groups or individuals
• “Persons that work in secrecy”
• “A chosen or intricate minority”
Myth Historic myths exert a strong influence on conspiracy theories. There are
esoteric elements as part of conspiracy theories
• “Esotericism”
• “A fight between good and evil”
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FIGURE 1 | Overview of the narrative construction design.
By assigning participants to groups and varying the cards
between these groups, different research questions can be
addressed. To test the influence of the presence of a specific inde-
pendent variable (= suit), the presence of this suit can be varied.
To fathom whether the presence of a specific category influences
the selection behavior concerning the other categories, only one
group of participants receives cards of this category (for example,
Queens present vs. no Queens present).
After the participant has indicated that he/ she is satisfied with
his/ her story, he/ she is further asked to rate “how plausible
the laid-out story is” with regard to the event in question, on a
five-point Likert scale (1 = not plausible, 5 = plausible). Finally,
the generated narrative is recorded (by writing down each card’s
code, printed on the backside that indicates category and fac-
tor level in the laid-out order). This procedure is conceptually
similar to Meichenbaum’s (1996) constructive-narrative ther-
apy which emphasizes the importance to re-construct one’s life
story when suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. Wilson
(2002) regards introspection as a personal narrative “whereby
people construct stories about their lives, much as a biographer
would” (p.162). This kind of introspection is seen as beneficial for
one’s mental well-being by Wilson. He also notes that the process
is vulnerable to omissions and simplifications—which are, in our
context, not interfering variables, but in fact the effect of interest.
McAdams (1997) even argues that we are in fact the stories we
create.
We devised the narrative construction to be a third way, besides
questionnaires and interviews. Already with three dozen cards
(for example, three suits à 12 cards), there are billions of pos-
sible stories, i.e., combinations. Compared to a questionnaire,
this allows for more diversified, idiosyncratic results. Reading,
evaluating, sorting and laying out multiple cards can be consid-
ered to be more demanding cognitively than serially answering a
number of questionnaire items, and it would allow to assess the
process of opinion formation, too; for example, by asking partici-
pants to think aloud while constructing the story. This comes at a
price: psychometric criteria can’t be applied straightforward here.
Compared to an interview, narrative construction is tighter.
The number of items is limited. A transcription and categoriza-
tion after the experiment is not necessary, as the cards are coded
and the chosen items can easily be written down.However, in con-
trast to an interview, a spontaneous introduction of new items is
not possible. The participant’s attention stays focused on the pro-
cess of story creation in narrative construction, while an interview
introduces a social facet. It depends on the research question if
introducing social interaction is instrumental or a confounder.
A simple evaluation of a narrative construction’s result would
be to count the number of items chosen from each suit (for
example, internal vs. external attribution, when there were two
according suits); and/or to count the number of card faces cho-
sen (e.g., how many participants have included “sports” in their
work-life-balance narration). This evaluation would be straight-
forward and could tell which attributional style is predominant
in the sample, and/or which aspects are most relevant for people
when it comes to balancing their life. By varying specific aspects,
the influence some information exerts onto other information
can be assessed. For instance, by giving some participants an addi-
tional suit, the impact of the availability of this information can
be measured. Another way is handing out some additional cards.
Sticking to the control belief example, we could assess how stories
change when people are offered cards allowing for counseling or
therapeutic advice.
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More sophisticated assessments could aim at the structure of
stories, e.g., look for typical sequences. Also, one could test if
certain aspects nearly always appear together, or turn out to be
mutually exclusive.
In sum, whenever a questionnaire seems too rigid, when a
thorough and attentive process is desirable, and when narrative
structures might be relevant, narrative construction might be an
option. However, when a dyadic social interaction is preferable,
when hypotheses are too vague, and when the topics in focus are
too broad to be represented adequately with a deck of cards, an
interview should be preferred. Yet, there are research questions
where a combination of narrative construction and interview is
appealing. By interacting with a deck of topic-related cards, par-
ticipants might get a grip on a topic, by evaluating all aspects the
researcher likes to consider. This sort of elaborate priming might
help to facilitate a subsequent interview.
CONSTRUCTING A 9/11 STORY
Material
For our research question, we compiled 14 cards for each suit
(see Table 1). With respect to the bottom-up derived elements
of conspiracy theories: two for group of conspirers, one for non-
transparency, one for publicity, three for odd event, three for
evidence and one formyth. Each itemwas present in each suit (i.e.,
3 cards), fueled with contents from typical (1) official, (2) limited
conspiratorial, and (3) unlimited conspiratorial viewpoints. The
official suit card always bore a category-related statement that was
in accordance with official 9/11 reports and documents (drawing
on respectable sources, e.g., governmental reports made public
on the internet). For example, an official group of conspirers-item
was: “9/11 mastermind were Islamist terrorists, led by Osama bin
Laden, to attack the detested Western culture.”
The card in the limited conspiratorial suit was prepared with
an item that contained an explanation describing a conspir-
acy of moderate strength. Specifically, this level was formed in
accordance with Lutter’s (2001) categorization of conspiracies,
corresponding to a conspiracy limited in time and space. This
can also be thought as matching Daniele Ganser’s (n.d.) 9/11-
view “let it happen on purpose” (LIHOP). In this view, the Bush
administration did not initiate the attacks, but knew beforehand
and did not take countermeasures. We compiled information
from web resources like Wikipedia that matched this level. The
“group of conspirers”-item here read: “The US administration
had let happen the 9/11 attack to justify the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq.”
In the unlimited conspiratorial suit, a card assumed a conspir-
acy with no clear bounds within space and time, or a “make it
happen on purpose” (MIHOP) viewpoint in the sense of Ganser
(n.d.). For example, it read: “The US administration had planned
and conducted the 9/11 attack to justify the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq.”
So for each of the six categories (odd event, evidence, non-
transparency, publicity, group of conspirers and myth), there was
at least one triplet of cards (one card with an official statement,
one limited conspiratorial and one unlimited conspiratorial);
details in Figure 1.
An exempt was a further category, absurdity, where all items
were completely off-wall: One assumed “thermonuclear devices
hidden in the Twin Towers,” one “killer satellites from outer
space,” and one stated that “the Syrian newspaper Al Thawra has
reported that 4000 Jewish WTC employees were warned before-
hand and did not show up on work on 9/11.” These items were
identical for both experimental groups, included for another
research question and are not considered any further for the
hypothesis discussed here.
Participants
Thirty persons (26 female,Mage = 22.4 years, range: 19–55 years)
took part in the study. They were recruited at and around the
campus of the University of Bamberg; they were naïve to the
aim of the study and had not been involved in any other study
described in this paper. The participants were randomly assigned
to two groups: (1) modest contents group and (2) extreme contents
group.
Procedure
The modest contents group was handed out a card deck with
29 items, containing the official as well as the limited conspir-
atorial suit (plus the three-card subset absurd). The extreme
contents group received the same deck and additionally the suit
with 13 unlimited conspiratorial items. All were asked to “con-
struct a plausible story of the events of September 11th 2001, as
a single coherent story or consisting of coherent or controversial
fragments,” without time restrictions. When the participant had
considered the story finished, the chosen items and their layout
were written down. The participant was then asked to rate “how
plausible the 9/11 story version just laid out is” on a five-point
Likert scale (among other questions related to other hypotheses).
Overall, the participants spend 21min on average to construct
their story, with a range from 8 to well over 30min.
RESULTS
The groups did not differ significantly in terms of age
[Mmodestgroup = 21.3, Mextremeroup = 24.8, F(1, 28) = 2.17,
p = 0.15, n.s.]. Each group consisted of 13 female and two male
participants.
To compare the stories between groups, we summed up the
number of cards chosen from each conspiratorial level (official,
limited and unlimited) over all categories. So for each participant,
we added up all official items, all limited conspiratorial items and
all unlimited conspiratorial items (the latter being trivially zero
for the group of participants who had not received any of these
cards).
In the modest conspiratorial condition, participants on aver-
age selected 7.7 out of 13 official items (SD = 2.6) and 6.8 out
of 13 limited conspiratorial items (SD = 3.3) to construct a 9/11
story (Figure 2). On average, 12.8 items were used, with a range
from 6 to 23 items. When the full set was available, there were 4.9
out of 13 official items selected on average (SD = 3.2), 6.2 limited
conspiratorial items (SD = 2.4) and 3.9 unlimited conspiratorial
items (SD = 3.7). 15.8 items were used on average, with a range
from 6 to 30 items.
With a One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), we tested if
number of items selected from the official as well as from the lim-
ited conspiratorial item pool (these numbers being the dependent
variables) differed between the two groups. The difference in the
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FIGURE 2 | Comparison of number of official and limited conspiratorial
items for both experimental groups in the to be generated 9/11
stories. Error bars indicate ±1 SEM (standard error of the mean).
number of official items selected was significant, F(1, 28) = 6.92,
p = 0.0137, η2p = 0.198, withM = 7.7 (SD = 2.6) for the official
andM = 4.9 (SD = 3.2) for the limited conspiratorial item pool,
whereas we found no difference in the number of selected limited
conspirational items, F(1, 28) < 1, p = 0.95, n.s.
Importantly, the different composition of items for the single
stories did not lead to different plausibility levels, thus poten-
tial acceptance of the regarding stories. When analyzing the
plausibility ratings of the stories, we could not reveal any dif-
ference between the extreme contents group (M = 4.0, SD = 0.5)
and the modest contents group (M = 3.8, SD = 0.9), F(1, 28) < 1,
p = 0.45, n.s.).
DISCUSSION
THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
People had to generate their own stories for one of the most
dramatic events of contemporary history. The available building
blocks were limited to a number of statements taken from the real
world, i.e., reflecting the official version of 9/11 as well asmild and
extreme conspiratorial views. The stimuli were selected to match
a set of categories that was identified to be typical for conspiracy
theories.
The small number of categories and the three-level design con-
fined the stories’ content. Yet, mathematically the participants
had the opportunity to build one out of over eight billion pos-
sible stories (already when the structure, i.e., the item order of
the laid story, is not regarded). Furthermore, there was no time
restriction.
Our results indicate that people construct a plausible explana-
tion for an important event by integrating all pieces of informa-
tion available, even if this information implies a huge conspiracy.
While one would expect a going to extremes in a discussion
of several persons, the significant drop in the number of canon-
ical items shows that a shift of the bounds of plausibility already
begins in an individual’s mind. Notably, there was no time pres-
sure, and the time people used can be considered well above
the duration of usual media coverage. Consequently, we would
not consider this effect as a heuristics in the sense of a cognitive
shortcut. Indeed, the effect appeared as a result of a thorough con-
sideration of information. The result was not a single-best answer,
but a coherent story.
We asked German people to construct a 9/11 narrative; we
might expect the stories’ content to be influenced by the partic-
ipants’ home country and, going hand in hand, the individual
concern with the 9/11 aftermath. However, we wanted to induce
active story construction, and for our German sample we could
be sure every participant knew of this event; and at the same time
we could be fairly sure there was no personal involvement—in a
sense that a participant might have known one of the 9/11 victims
personally.
As items were taken from real-world sources, they were not
matched in terms of representativeness for a given category or
factor level. Thus, there will very likely have been differences in
conspiratorialness within the groups. Additionally, there were dif-
ferent levels of mutual exclusion: some extremely conspiratorial
items were not compatible with their official counterpart (and
vice versa); for example, a controlled detonation ruled out the
planes as ultimate cause for the collapse of the towers. Other
items, however, were mutually consistent; for example, a gov-
ernment lying about Pearl Harbor can be in accordance with an
Al-Qaeda attack. Further research has to show if a matching of
items is possible; and if it is desirable, as heterogeneous and in
part mutually exclusive information is characteristic of real-world
opinion formation.
Another promising research question would be the stability
of generated narratives. For example, if participants are asked to
construct a story again 1 or 2 days later: will they produce the
same plot?
The shift from a moderate toward an extreme conspiracy did
not come with a decline of self-perceived story plausibility. What
we did not test, however, was to which extent the participants
identified with their story. Would they cling to it when they
were confronted with the necessity to act; for example, when
they would be asked to defend their narrative against critical
questions?
One could object that participants were limited by the story
fragments available, particularly in the non-extreme condition,
and thus not able to produce the “perfect” conspiracy they would
have looked for. If so, however, we would have expected a lower
plausibility rating on average for this group; or, alternatively,
a drop in mildly conspiratorial items when the full set was
presented, with the number of canonical items not affected.
While the method and the results presented here could
undoubtedly be optimized, they indicate that extreme positions
in an alleged conspiracy foster the active acquisition of that con-
spiracy. This indicates a danger we will discuss in the light of one
of the most heated public debates in Germany of recent years.
GERMANY IS ABOLISHING ITSELF: THE PRACTICAL DANGERS OF
ABSURD STATEMENTS
Sarrazin’s (2010) book Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany is
abolishing itself ) was a “blockbuster”—in a double sense. On the
one hand, it was a huge success in terms of publicity, spear-
heading Germany’s non-fiction bestseller list for 21 consecutive
Frontiers in Psychology | Personality Science and Individual Differences July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 453 | 6
Raab et al. The Sarrazin effect
weeks (Buchreport.de, n.d.), making it the most successful book
about politics from a German author of the decade (Media
Control, 2010). On the other hand, it has mined public debate
about the integration of people with migration background until
today.
In his book Sarrazin devises a scenario which displays all of
our criteria for a conspiracy theory: While Germany’s population
is diminishing,Muslimminorities keep growing due to constantly
high birth rates (odd event). Thus, Sarrazin predicts that the “real”
Germans—cultural pureness can be seen as the esoteric myth-
element here—will soon be outnumbered by the offspring of
immigrants from Muslim countries. Highly fertile, yet unwilling
to adopt our value system, these people (group of conspirers) are
secretly (non-transparency) taking over the German society, grad-
ually reorganizing it in accordance with their religious beliefs.
Sarrazin’s line of argument mixes facts, opinions and anecdotes
from very different areas and levels of life and knowledge (evi-
dence). Most controversial were his crude assumptions of an “IQ
score being 15 points higher” (Sarrazin, 2010, p.93) among Jews
of European origin; as well as his claim that we “become more
stupid on average for mere reasons of demography” (p.100), as
Muslim immigrants, in Sarrazin’s argumentation, would lower
society’s general intelligence level. Last but not least, Sarrazin
claims that the truth about all this is being suppressed by excessive
political correctness in public debate and that this self-imposed
censorship is a result of collective feelings of guilt dating back to
the “Third Reich” (publicity).
Many protagonists in the debate refuted the extreme state-
ments about a linkage between religion, fertility and religiously
determined intellectual brilliance. Yet, they admitted that Sarrazin
had made some important points about migration in general (as
critically discussed, for example, by Lau (2009), when Sarrazin’s
views had become public for the first time). Notably, the book
review rated helpful by most other users at the British online
bookstore amazon.co.uk, reads as follows: “. . . yes there are ele-
ments that most people will find hard to agree with no matter
how persuasively argued but that shouldn’t detract from the vast
majority of what is being argued in the book” (Thinkforachange,
2010).
Our question here is not if these radical aspects of Sarrazin’s
book had been a means of promotional success, which seems
beyond doubt: he got prime-time attention for months. The
validity (and non-validity) of his assumptions has been discussed
extensively, for example in Foroutan (2010). Also, the social
dimension—has there been a taboo that Sarrazin has dared to
break, or has this alleged taboo just been an excuse for some to
spread xenophobic attitudes—is not in focus here.
On basis of the findings of our empirical study, we have good
reason to believe that the presence of rather extreme statements
shifts peoples’ cognitive bounds when they construct their opin-
ion about complex political events: they will tend to construct a
more radical view when such information is offered. In this case:
even if people won’t adopt the view of Jewish intelligence DNA,
the presence of this statement—say, while reading the book or
while listening to a debate on TV—might result in a more extreme
personal narrative. Adaptation research points us in the direc-
tion of the possible reason for this: As soon as we perceive and
process extreme items, we integrate them into our mental repre-
sentation (e.g., Strobach and Carbon, 2013) yielding adaptations
toward the new items (e.g., Carbon, 2011), thus the whole nar-
rative gets more extreme. What has been shown by these authors
to work in the visual domain, seems to hold for verbal, semantic
information, too.
So a conspiracy theory (in the sense outlined here) bears many
dangers: the complex and anecdotic reasoning immunizes against
falsification. Extreme constituents attract attention and polarize
the debate; and they also might induce a shift of people’s individ-
ual explanatory constructs toward a conspiratorial plot. In sum,
a flavor of oddness might not be a weakness of such theories, but
indeed an integral part and enabler of their persuasive power.
CONSPIRACIES AND REPTILE POLITICAL LEADERS
Extreme and sometimes absurd statements seem to be an ingre-
dient of many conspiracy theories. But what role do reptile aliens
and flyingNazi saucers play in conspiracy theories? Are such state-
ments merely included for dramatic effect in order to attract our
attention, or do they really affect what we believe in the end?
We have shown that the presence of rather extreme statements
does have an effect on people’s story construction. The “official”
view becomes of lesser importance. Moderate items are disre-
garded, and in turn extreme statements are integrated. With a case
study of Sarrazin’s book Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany is
abolishing itself ) we illustrated the danger of a theory containing
established facts, speculations and rather crude opinions.
We focused on the constructive nature of forming an opin-
ion. Such an opinion was seen as a story—a system of coherent
information—answering key questions related to a given event or
process: Why did it happen? Who is responsible? Who is affected?
We deem this view crucial for research on conspiracy theories.
One does not simply perceive such a theory to accept or refute
it. One will rather match this theory with one’s own eventual-
ity space, that is, all things one deems possible. In the end, the
eventuality space might be recalibrated to incorporate new facts
just as recent findings on the adaptivity of memory representa-
tions have shown (e.g., Carbon, 2011; Carbon and Ditye, 2011).
In turn, the personmight come upwith a new (conspiracy) theory
that shares some, but not necessarily all elements of the original
theory. As Leman and Cinnirella (2007) has already noted, biases
and heuristics play an important role. While he focused on the
cause-effect-relationship, we considered the scope of information
as an influencing factor on the frame of plausibility.
It is these dynamics of reception, alteration and propagation
that account for the many-faceted phenomenon we call conspir-
acy theory. The cognitive effort, i.e., considering information in
the eventuality space, might be rewarding and satisfying in itself;
just like an aesthetic experience or amental exercise (cf. Muth and
Carbon, 2013). Unlike a crossword puzzle, however, reception
and propagation of a conspiracy theory allow for intercommu-
nion. Yet, as many participants reported afterwards, constructing
a story can ultimately be fun.
These results might also explain why some conspiracy theories
are believed—one might think of reptile aliens governing impor-
tant nations in disguise of familiar political leaders—, although
they seem stark mad to outsiders. Given the mechanism found
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here holds for an ongoing, long-term cycle of information seek-
ing and opinion formation, it might be possible that a small but
constant shift toward an extreme will not arouse the truth-seeker’s
suspicion.
As a next step, we will take a closer look at the process of
story construction, e.g., by letting participants think aloud. Right
now, we do not know what motifs guide the individual’s con-
structive process. With a larger sample, we will also compare
the structure of the generated narratives to identify whether
there are certain aspects, respectively content categories that are
more likely to be influenced by the presence of extreme opin-
ions. Taking a closer look at individual differences (Are there
predictors for people who will fall for this effect? Are there peo-
ple who might even be deterred by extremist testimonies, thus
responding with a shift in the opposite direction?) is on the
agenda, too.
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